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CAUSAL PLURALISM AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE:
AN UNDEREXPOSED PROBLEM1
Leen De Vreese
ABSTRACT
Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the consequences of this
view on causation for scientific knowledge and scientific methodology are heavily
underexposed in the present debate. My aim in this paper is to argue that an
epistemological-methodological point of view should be valued as a line of approach on its
own and to demonstrate how epistemological- methodological causa l pluralism differs in
its scope from conceptual and metaphysical causal pluralism. Further, I defend
epistemological-methodological causal pluralism and try to illustrate that scientific practice
needs diverse causal concepts in diverse domains, and even diverse causal concepts within
singular domains.
1. Introduction 
Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the
consequences of this view on causation for scientific methodology and
scientific knowledge are heavily underexposed in the present debate. The
current literature in defence of causal pluralism seems to focus
particularly on conceptual causal pluralism. Conceptual causal pluralists
are convinced that our everyday notion of “causation” cannot be
described univocally. No single current theory of causation seems
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sufficient to cover our notion of “cause” in all its diversity, which
convinces conceptual causal pluralists that we will have to combine
several causal theories in one way or another to get a grip on all these
ways the notion of cause is used in our everyday causal talk. Another
reason to break with conceptual causal monism is the finding that
contextual factors influence the way we interpret the notion of “cause”.
Our interests, human limitations, and specific goals in asking for a cause,
can affect the causal concept used and the causal selections made. Only a
few authors overtly argue in one way or another that causal pluralism is
not only a conceptual matter, but can also be defended on the basis of
metaphysical considerations. The conviction is then that causation is also
“plural” in reality, apart from how we perceive it and reason about it.
One can, for example, argue that several empirical relations can be
discerned which can all be labelled “causal”, or that each level of
organization has its specific causal characteristics which can only be
captured by means of different approaches to causation in the world.
However, one does not need to be metaphysical causal pluralist to be
conceptual causal pluralist. One can for example argue that there is in
fact only one kind of causal relation in the world - possibly at the
fundamental organizational level - but that we need several causal
concepts in everyday causal reasoning for pragmatic reasons. I am
convinced one should discern epistemological- methodological causal
pluralism as a still different approach, stating that we need different
concepts of causation to gain scientific knowledge. Surprisingly, the
latter kind of causal pluralism is currently hardly debated. If scientific
examples are referred to in the debate on causal pluralism, they are used
to defend a certain conceptual or metaphysical approach to causation, but
hardly ever is it recognized that taking a conceptual and/or metaphysical
pluralistic stance bears consequences for our scientific methodology and
scientific causal knowledge, and that this in turn implies specific
philosophical questions with respect to our scientific notion of causation.
My aim in this paper is to argue that an epistemological-
methodological point of view (to which I will further refer by the
contraction epimethodology) should be valued as a line of approach on
its own, and to demonstrate how epimethodological causal pluralism
differs in its scope from conceptual and metaphysical causal pluralism. In
section 2, I discuss how an epimethodological approach is different from,
but meanwhile related to, one’s conceptual and metaphysical causal point
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of view. In section 3, I comment on Phil Dowe’s argumentation in
Physical Causation (Dowe, 2000) to make clear that different scientific
domains lean on different approaches to causation in their attempt to gain
appropriate causal knowledge, and to illustrate further that a
metaphysical approach has to be distinguished from an epi-
methodological approach to causation. Additionally, I strengthen my
point by indicating the applicability of the totally different approach of J.
L. Mackie (1974) to the engineering sciences. Section 4 demonstrates
that different approaches to causation can be even useful within a single
domain of science by referring to the biomedical sciences. Section 3 and
4 show the need of a pluralistic epimethodological approach. I further
substantiate this claim in section 5, by arguing that we should subscribe
to epimethodological causal pluralism if we aim at accurate and adequate
causal conceptions to base our scientific methodology and knowledge on.
Section 6 contains my final conclusions.
2. Epimethodological causal pluralism vis-à-vis conceptual and
metaphysical causal pluralism
2.1. Differences
Philosophers working on the topic of causation often use scientific
examples as similar to everyday examples, and hence to underpin the
conceptual point of view defended. Although our notion of causation in
science is not at all totally different from our everyday notion of
causation, this treatment does not recognize that science has specific
aims and interests which can affect the way we reason about causation
within scientific practice. A scientist will, for example, often be looking
for causal relations on which general policy decisions can be based,
while in everyday causal reasoning, one will rather be looking for
singular factors responsible for certain specific effects. This example
shows why it is not justifiable to interpret an epimethodological approach
to causation as completely similar to a conceptual one. 
On the other hand, science is often interpreted as a unique point of
reference for finding out what causation is in the world within the
literature on causation. In other words, science is used as a means to
develop a metaphysical approach to causation. Phil Dowe describes his
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approach in Physical Causation (Dowe, 2000) precisely as one that leans
on the results of science to find out what the language-independent entity
called “causation” is:
 
[...] there are procedures for investigating such an entity, namely,
the methods of science, which is in the business of investigating
language-independent objects. Empirical philosophy can draw on
the results of science, and so can investigate such concepts, in this
case causation ‘in the objects’. (Dowe, 2000:7)
  
He further argues that this “empirical analysis” is not a conceptual
analysis of the way this term is used by scientists, but rather a conceptual
analysis of the concept inherent in scientific theories. This way, Dowe
hopes to get rid off false intuitions on what causation is. However, his
approach is still problematic. First, science itself is not entirely free of
(causal) intuitions. The weight of these intuitions is reduced to minimal
portions in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, but science can
nevertheless not do without a minimum of intuitions as Timothy
Williamson (2004) argues. Further, there is no way to ensure ourselves
that these “scientific” intuitions, or these intuitions on which science is
based, are better than our everyday intuitions. All the more because the
former are in line with the latter.
Secondly, the assumption that there is an objective, univocal
concept of causation implicit in our scientific theories can be questioned,
as is done by Daniel Steel2. Steel argues that any empirical analysis of
causation will inevitably be a substantive thesis over and above what is
given by the theories from physics or any other scientific discipline,
since the term “cause” is never explicitly defined within these theories.
Further, since the aggregate of scientific theories enables us to interpret
“causation” in widely divergent ways, the choice for a single approach as
the most adequate will always appeal to intuitions on the proper usage of
the term “cause”. 
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Additionally, it can be argued that causal knowledge in general is
not perpective-free, as is extensively defended by Huw Price in (Price,
2001) and (Price, 2007):
 
I don’t want to eliminate causation altogether from science, but
merely to put it in its proper place, as a ca tegory that we bring to
the world — a projection of the deliberative standpoint. Causal
reasoning needn’t be bad science, on my view. On the contrary, it’s
often an indispensable construct for coping with the situation we
find ourselves in, as enquirers and especially as agents. It is bad
science to fail to appreciate these facts, but not bad science to
continue to use causal notions, where appropriate, having done so.
Some perspectives simply cannot be transcended. (Price, 2007:
290)
Huw Price does not want to claim that causality is ontologically
subjective, in that the existence of causal relations would depend on the
presence of an observator. In his pragmatist approach, Price disregards
this problem of ontological realism, namely whether there are real causal
relations in the world when there are no agents observing them. Price’s
pragmatic causal view states that causality is practice-subjective.
Practice-subjectivity is no ontological matter but neither a psychological
matter in that talk of causation would be talk purely about agents or
agency, and not about the world. Price’s practice-subjective pragmatism
about causation is tied to the conviction that we cannot understand the
notion of “causation” if we do not understand its origins in the lives and
practice of the agents using this notion. According to this view, the
concept of “cause” is essentially tied to the experience of agents. This
implies that our notion of cause is developed from a specific perspective,
which cannot be transcended. Hence, an adequate philosophical
description of causality should refer to the role of the concept in the lives
and practice of these agents. This does nonetheless not justify the claim
that there would have been no causation in the world if there had not
been any agents observing them, nor that our notion of “cause” cannot
tell us anything about the world. To the contrary, it tells us a lot about the
world, but it does this from a specific perspective which we cannot
escape from.
In conclusion, the inevitable influence of scientific intuitions, the
absence of an objective univocal concept inherent in our scientific
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theories, and the perspectivalism of (scientific) causal knowledge
demonstrate that it is not justifiable to treat an epimethodological
approach as similar to a metaphysical one. 
2.2. Relations 
Notwithstanding that an epimethodological approach to causation should
be discerned from a conceptual and metaphysical one, such an approach
should be compatible with the conceptual and metaphysical position
taken toward causation. One should situate an epimethodological
approach in between a conceptual and metaphysical approach. As has
already been said, our scientific notion of causation lies in line with our
everyday notion, but will on the other hand be affected by the specific
goals, interests, etc. of the scientific domain which is involved. On the
other hand, although scientists aim at a precise description of causal
relations in the world, their views will not be perspective-free, will be
determined by human restrictions, and built on their specific scientific
interests and convictions. These features of scientist’s causal view on
their domain have not to be interpreted as a problem, but might just be
necessary to be able to gain scientific knowledge at all, and hence to
reach a description which is as precise as possible but meanwhile also
useful in practice. Just like Huw Price argues with respect to
perspectivalism:
 
[...] unmasking the perspectival character of a concept does not
lead to simple-minded antirealism — we may continue to use the
concept, and even to affirm, in a variety of ways, the objectivity of
the subject-matter concerned, despite our new understanding of
what is involved (of where  we ‘stand’) in doing so. Nevertheless,
there is a tendency to think that perspectivity is incompatible with
good science, in the sense that science always aims for the
perspective-free standpoint, the view from nowhere. (Price,
2007:253)
I will focus here on the relations between an epimethodological and
metaphysical approach to causation. Taking a certain metaphysical
position will entail specific questions concerning scientific causal
knowledge. These kinds of questions become even more significant if
one takes a pluralistic metaphysical position toward causation. It are
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these kinds of questions which characterize this separate line of approach
to causal pluralism. 
Let me illustrate the specific character of an epimethodological
approach by way of a biological example of James Woodward (2003):
 
As an illustration, consider the lac operon model for E. coli due to
Jacob and Monod, which was widely regarded as a seminal
discovery in molecular genetics. When lactose is present in its
environment, E. coli produces enzymes that metabolize it, but
when lactose is absent, these enzymes are not produced. What
determines whether these enzymes are produced? According to the
model proposed by Jacob and Monod, there are three structural
genes that code for the enzymes as well as an operator region that
controls the access of RNA polymerase to the structural genes. In
the absence of lactose, a regulatory gene is active which produces a
repressor protein which binds to the operator for the structural
genes, thus preventing transcription. In the presence of lactose,
allolactose, an isomer formed from lactose, binds to the repressor,
inactivating it and thereby preventing it from repressing the
operator, so that transcription proceeds. Biologists describe this as
a case of “negative control”. Unlike “positive control,” in which
“an inducer interacts directly with the genome to switch
transcription on” (Griffiths, M iller, Suzuki, Lewontin, and Gelbart
1996, p.550), the inducer in this case, allolactose, initiates
transcription by interfering with the operation of an agent that
prevents transcription. [...] A causal relationship is clearly present
between the presence of allolactose and the production of the
enzymes, and the former figures in the explanation of the latter, but
there is no transfer of energy from, or spatiotemporally continuous
process linking, the two. (Woodward, 2003:225-226)
Woodward in fact used this example to underpin his view that one should
resist a proliferation of concepts of causation in favour of a monistic
conceptual approach. Specifically, he was arguing against the distinction
made by Ned Hall (2004) between causation as dependence (which can
be grasped in terms of counterfactuals) and causation as production
(which needs another than a counterfactual approach). According to Hall,
some causes can be causes in, for example, the dependence sense, but not
in the production sense. Allolactose in the example above would form an
instance of such a cause. In contrast, Woodward defends a
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manipulationist account following which allolactose should
straightforwardly be taken as a cause, without making any distinctions
with regard to those inducers involved in what biologists refer to as
“positive control”. Biologists also seem to refer to both of these causes as
just straightforward causes, and this convinces Woodward that one does
not need Hall’s distinction. I think Woodward is too fast in making this
conclusion. In fact, Woodward’s example conflicts with his own
conclusion, since biologists do make a distinction. Although they refer to
both kinds of influence of inducers as “causes”, they introduce the labels
“positive control” and “negative control” to discriminate between both.
These labels clearly refer to two discernable ways of causing the
transcription. 
The answers to metaphysical questions will bear consequences for
our notion of causation in the sciences and will lead to specific
epimethodological questions. Suppose we accept that causality in the
world consists of a single kind of empirical relation, but that we
nonetheless find that a distinction between production causes and
dependence causes is frequently used in biology. In that case we should
be able to justify this distinction in biology and to relate it to a univocal
metaphysical approach. Typical epimethodological questions that will
follow are: Why do we need this distinction in scientific practice? How
are they related to the univocal metaphysical account? Does one of both
refer to real causation, and the other to a kind of quasi-causation3?
Alternatively, are they both subconcepts of the univocal metaphysical
concept? In that case, can all relevant causal relations within the
biological domain be captured by way of these two subconcepts, or do
we need to make further conceptual distinctions? Etc. Suppose, on the
other hand, that we accept that the distinction between production and
dependence refers to a real distinction between two kinds of empirical
relations in the world. This conviction would, for example, lead to the
following question: Are both kinds of causal relations present at all
levels of organization and are they by consequence of equal importance
for our causal knowledge of all domains of science? 
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All these questions form typical epimethodological questions,
related to, but not equal to, metaphysical questions regarding causation.
Given the importance of causality in science, it is important to be aware
of the specific character of the epimethodological approach.
Epimethodological questions become even of crucial importance if one
takes a pluralist position toward causation. However, specific
epimethodological questions are hardly tackled in the current debate on
causal pluralism. I am nevertheless convinced that we should appreciate
the epimethodological approach as important on its own within the
debate on causal pluralism. Generally spoken, such an approach should
investigate whether scientists reason in a pluralistic way in their search
for knowledge; which convictions lie at the basis of pluralistic scientific
causal reasoning; what the consequences are of causal pluralism for
scientific methodology; whether one can find differences between
different domains in the answers to these questions; and if so, what these
differences are.
To concretize the concerns of the epimethodological approach to
causal pluralism, I tackle in the following sections two general
epimethodological questions of central importance, namely whether we
need diverse concepts of causation in diverse scientific domains (section
3), and whether we need diverse concepts of causation within single
scientific domains (section 4). The examples will make clear that a
positive answer should be given to both of these questions.
3. Diverse concepts in diverse scientific domains
3.1. Conserved quantities in the physical sciences 
In section 1, I indicated that Phil Dowe (2000) describes his approach to
causation as one that leans on the results of science to find out what the
language-independent entity called “causation” is. In this section, I will
argue against the line of argumentation of Dowe (2000) to make clear
that different scientific domains lean on different approaches to causation
to gain appropriate causal knowledge, and to demonstrate that a
metaphysical approach has to be dist inguished from an
epimethodological approach to causation.
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In fulfilling his goal, Dowe rejects one by one all of the “major
theories of physical causation” (Dowe, 2000:12), such as Lewis’
counterfactual theory, Hume’s regularity theory, Suppes’ probabilistic
account and Salmon’s process theory. For example, in the introduction to
the second chapter, Dowe announces: 
First, the Humean deterministic accounts are rejected on the
grounds that science yields examples of indeterministic causation,
and second the probabilistic accounts of causation, including
Lewis’s counterfactual probabilistic theory, are shown to fall to a
well-directed example of chance-lowering causality. (Dowe,
2000:14) 
In both cases, the examples used are mainly taken from the domain of
physics. For Dowe even a single physical counterexample forms a reason
to reject a whole theory:
In particular, probabilistic theories, taken as aiming to provide an
empirical account of singular causation, fall to an important
counterexample from subatomic physics. (Dowe, 2000:40) (my
italics) 
Subsequently, transference accounts are rejected, mainly because they
cannot cope with immanent causation, a kind of causation which Dowe
wants to be able to deal with because it is necessary to understand certain
physical processes such as a spaceship’s inertia as a cause of its
continuing motion:
there are a number of difficulties with the transference account.
These concern problems of the identity over time of the transferred
quantities, and the direction of causation. Further, I argue that there
is a kind of causation, immanent causation, or causation as
persistence, which is neglected by the transference accounts.
(Dowe, 2000:41)
Subsequently, Dowe proclaims Salmon’s theory as “superior" to the
others discussed, though still not adequate. The destructive criticism on
the alternative approaches paves the way for the defence of Dowe’s own
process theory of causation. In view of the foregoing chapters, it is clear
that Dowe will conceive his own theory as the single appropriate theory
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of “physical causation”. In a nutshell, this theory comes down to the
following:
1. A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines which
involves exchange of a conserved quantity. 
2. A causal process  is a world line of an object which possesses a
conserved quantity.
 
A “conserved quantity" is any quantity which is universally
conserved, and current scientific theory is our best guide as to what
these are. Thus, we have good reason to believe that mass-energy,
linear momentum, and charge are conserved quantities. (Dowe,
1995:323)
Now, what is wrong with this approach of Dowe? My criticism here does
not concern the content of Dowe’s theory and the “internal” relation with
alternative ones. What I think of are criticisms about the way he presents
his own theory and opposes the others. First of all: Why basing his
approach almost exclusively on examples from physics? What is
precisely meant by “physical causation"? The term is simply thrown into
the arena without further clarification. Nowhere in his book, nor in his
articles, Dowe makes explicitly clear which domain(s) of application he
is talking about. His reference to all other theories of causation as
theories of “physical causation” gives the impression that the word
“physical” has to be interpreted very broadly since these alternative
theories are meant to be broadly applicable. However, when taking a
closer look at Dowe’s argumentation, his description of a conserved
quantity and the examples used in his book, it appears to concern a
theory of physical causation in a rather narrow sense. It is in fact quite
clear that his theory is not at all apt to get a grip on, for example, the
concept of cause in the social and behavioral sciences. The interests of
researchers in those domains of science are not in line with a physical
approach to causation focussing on the conservation of momentum,
energy, etc. This is not the kind of knowledge which social scientists
search for and use in their explanations. For example, how applying
Dowe’s theory to the way scientists explain the fluctuation of quotations
on the stock exchange as an effect of political or social incidents, or the
mental condition of people as an effect of life events? Dowe’s theory is
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clearly not able to give an adequate description of the way scientists
come to these kinds of causal explanations, while other approaches to
causation are better apt to get a grip on the kind of causal reasoning
involved when investigating such kinds of events. 
From the book (Dowe, 2000) and his 1992 article (Dowe, 1992) it
becomes eventually clear that Dowe is reasoning from a strong
reductionistic point of view combined with some kind of supervenience
account of causes on conserved quantities:
Another possible criticism concerns reduction. Fair’s approach
involves a commitment to reduction of all science to physics,
which some may not like. Salmon avoids this with his vague
notions of “structure” and “characteristic”. These can apply to any
area of science, whereas energy and momentum may not. The
present suggestion does not share  this advantage. One answer is
that the generality of “conserved quantity” might allow this to be
used as a testable conjecture in various fields of science. But it is
unlikely that it would stand the test: conservation laws seem to be
confined to the physical sciences. A more desirable option is to
take a middle road and adopt a supervenience account such as that
of Kim (1984) where causes supervene on conserved quantities
(see Menzies 1988). (Dowe, 1992:214-215)  
However, this view is not explicitly referred to as the basis for his line of
argumentation, and neither is it thoroughly motivated. His whole theory
is nonetheless strongly connected to this reductionistic presupposition
and the presupposition itself is not at all self-evident. Not everyone will
easily accept this reductionistic causal point of view on the world.4 And
even if Dowe’s reductionistic point of view would be justified as a
metaphysical approach, we are clearly not able, and probably even not
interested, in studying causal processes at all organizational levels in
terms of causal processes on the elementary organizational level, which
would not make a difference for Dowe’s approach given his
metaphysical aims, but would be an important fact for an
epimethodological approach. 
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Hence, although Dowe claims that his approach is founded on the
causal concepts inherent in scientific theories, his choice for physics is
clearly based on a further metaphysical presupposition in favor of
physics, which is crucial for his point of view but nonetheless not
defendable on the basis of “the results of science” on which Dowe
nonetheless claims to found his whole approach. Whether this
metaphysical presupposition is justified, and whether the resulting
metaphysical approach to causation is justified, is not the concern of an
epimethodological approach to causation. What will concern such an
approach is that the choice for another scientific domain than physics
would have resulted in a totally different approach to causation. The
causal concepts inherent in other than physical scientific theories will
clearly not all be of the kind on which Dowe’s approach is based. 
Seen from an epimethodological point of view, and provided that
one takes a pluralistic stance, there is no problem at all in the inadequacy
of Dowe’s process theory of causation for the characterization of causal
processes in other domains such as the social sciences. From such a point
of view, one can appreciate Dowe’s approach as one that characterizes
the concept “cause” prominent in the physical sciences. As Dowe in fact
admits himself, the same characterization will not be applicable in any
area of science. Apart from causal reasoning in the social sciences,
conserved quantities do neither seem to play a prominent role in causal
reasoning in, for example, the domain of engineering or biomedicine,
which will be focussed on in the following two sections.
3.2. Sufficient and necessary conditions in the engineering sciences
Let me start with trying to find out which kind of approach to causation
is prominent in causal reasoning in the engineering sciences.5 Engineers
have to think in terms of function. The physical structure of the things
they design, should be a means to produce a certain effect Y. Hence,
building an X has the function to produce Y. In other words, whenever a
physical structure enables X to take place, Y should occur. Put still
differently, if X is a good tool to produce Y, then Y will occur under the
usual ceteris paribus condition that no disturbances occur. However,
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different physical structures can form a useful tool to perform the same
function, leading to the same effect. Common to all these structures will
be that they are designed with knowledge of some physical phenomena
and with the purpose to take certain actions that lead to the desired
effect. Hence, what engineers need to think of are designs of physical
structures which have, within the normal background conditions, the
necessary and sufficient characteristics to function in the production of a
specific effect. I take an example from Peter Kroes (in a detailed way
presented in (Kroes, 1998)), namely the Newcomen engines, which are
one of the earliest types of steam engines. Those engines were used for
pumping water, which is their function Y. An explanation of how the
fulfillment of this function was brought about by the machine, will have
to refer to certain physical phenomena (transforming water into steam
increases its volume manyfold, cooling of steam in a closed vessel
creates a vacuum, etc.), the design of the engineer (the steam engine
consists of certain parts such as a cylinder, piston, great beam, boiler,
etc.; the piston may move up and down in the cylinder, etc.), and a series
of actions (after opening the steam valve the cylinder fills with steam and
the piston moves up, closing of the steam valve and injection of cold
water creates a vacuum in the cylinder; etc.) (Kroes, 1998:8). All these
elements together explain how the function is fulfilled by the machine in
normal circumstances.
This example indicates that the primary concept of causation
within the engineering sciences can probably best be captured by John L.
Mackie’s approach to causation (Mackie, 1974). This approach is based
on the approach of John Stuart Mill (Mill, 1973). Mackie takes Mill’s
“plurality of causes” as the basis of his own approach: 
It is not true that one effect must be connected with only one cause,
or assemblage of conditions; that each phenomenon can be
produced only in one way. There are often several independent
modes in which the same phenomenon could have originated. One
fact may be the consequent in several invariable sequences; it may
follow, with equal uniformity, any one of several antecedents, or
collections of antecedents. (Mill, 1973: Book III, Chapter 10,
Section 1; cited in Mackie, 1974:61) 
This is formally expressed by Mackie as “ ‘All (ABC or DGH or JKL)
are followed by P’ and ‘All P are preceded by (ABC or DGH or JKL)’ ”
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(Mackie, 1974:62). He ascribes the following characteristics to the
elements of this definition: 
the complex formula ‘(ABC or DGH or JKL)’ represents a
condition which is both necessary and sufficient for P: each
conjunction, such as ‘ABC’, represents a condition which is
sufficient but not necessary for P. Besides, ABC is a minimal
sufficient condition: none of its conjuncts is redundant: no part of
it, such as AB, is itself sufficient for P. But each single factor, such
as A, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for P. Yet it is
clearly related to P in an important way: it is an insufficient but
non-redundant part of an unnecessary  but sufficient condition: it
will be convenient to call this (using the first letters of the italicized
words) an inus condition. (Mackie, 1974:62)  
The single factors of the disjunction of conjunctions can further also be
negative conditions. } is then the absence of a counteracting cause A.
Mackie recognizes these causes as real causes, contrary to Mill. Further
Mackie also introduces the importance of a causal field (F), which forms
the background of the causal event, but does not make part of it. An
explosion in a block of flats will, for example, be attributed to a gas leak,
while other factors such as the presence of the building and its gas pipes,
and of people living in that building and lighting cigarettes from time to
time, will rather be interpreted as the “normal” background situation
within which the causal event arose. 
Mill’s description of “causation” is reflected in the notion of cause
prominent in the engineering sciences, as described above. Note the
following properties: its focus on deterministic causation, the
incorporated idea of the importance of the plurality of single factors
leading all together to a certain effect, and the plurality of different
possible conjunctions of conditions all sufficient to lead to the effect, the
inclusion of the absence of certain interfering elements as genuine causes
and the importance of the causal field as the background within which
the causal event arises. All these characteristics describe a notion of
“cause” which lies much closer to the way one reasons about causation in
the engineering sciences than, for example, in the physical sciences or
maybe even clearer, in the biomedical sciences.
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4. Diverse concepts within a single scientific domain: average effects
in the biomedical and social sciences
While the interests of physical scientists lie in detailed descriptions of
the causal processes and causal interactions leading up to some particular
effect, social and biomedical scientists are interested in general overall
causal patterns recurring in the population. These causal patterns are not
necessarily exceptionless, as is presupposed in the case of the
engineering sciences. The precise causal history leading up to one
particular effect in singular cases is often very complicated and
intractable and not interesting for the general purposes of the biomedical
sciences. This led e.g. John Dupré (1993) and Ronald N. Giere (1997) to
the following view with respect to probabilistic theories of causation: 
[...] causes should be assessed in terms of average effect not only
across different causa l routes, but also across varying causal
contexts. (Dupré, 1993:199)
and hence: 
One interesting fact about these models is that it could turn out that
C  is causally irrelevant for E in the population U even though C  is
not causally irrelevant for E in all individuals in U. [...] Population
models always average over individuals and, therefore, ignore what
might be important differences among individuals. (Giere,
1997:204-205).  
It is argued one should execute controlled experiments on fair samples to
find statistically significant differences between experimental and control
groups. These differences are claimed to be good standards for causal
judgments about populations. Dupré opposes the rival view of e.g. Nancy
Cartwright (1979), Paul Humphreys (1989) and Ellery Eells (1991). They
hold on to the context unanimity condition. This condition maintains
that: 
a genuine cause must raise the probability of a genuine effect of it
in every causal background context . (Eells, 1991:94) (my bold) 
More specifically, this would come down to the following: 
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To use an example of Cartwright’s (1979), ingesting an acid poison
(X) is causally positive for death (Y) when no alkali poison has
been ingested (~F), but when an alkali poison has been ingested
(F), the ingestion of an acid poison is causally negative  for death. I
will argue that in a case like this it is best to deny that X is a
positive causal factor for Y, even if, overall (for the population as a
whole), the probability of death when an acid poison has been
ingested is greater than the probability of death when no acid
poison has been ingested (that is, even if Pr(Y|X) > Pr(Y|~X). I will
argue that it is best in this case to say that X is causally mixed for
Y, and despite the overall or average probability increase, X is
nevertheless not a positive causal factor for y in the population as a
whole. (Eells, 1991:94) 
As John Dupré (1993) argues, this kind of causal knowledge is not of
interest in social and biomedical scientific practice. What he nonetheless
does not recognize is that the context unanimity approach would form a
more adequate approach than the average effect approach for finding out
what the real causal structure of the world consists in. Dupré fails to
discriminate here between a metaphysical and an epimethodological
approach. He takes his own approach, which is clearly an
epimethodological one, as a metaphysical approach. His own approach
should then replace the unanimity approach, which he doesn’t want to
appreciate as a metaphysical one because of its impractibility: 
We should avoid metaphysical doctrines for which we neither
have, nor possibly could  have, empirical evidence of applicability.
This is a methodological principle that the unanimity thesis fails
dismally to satisfy. (Dupré, 1993:201)
Although the unanimity approach may not be practicable, it would form
an adequate toolbox for metaphysical purposes. It would however not be
adequate for the main interests of social and biomedical sciences, where
the context unanimity condition is of little or no practical use. What the
approach does, is demonstrating the limitations and presuppositions of
our research methods. This seems precisely what a metaphysical
approach should do. Being of practical use is to the contrary something
one should expect from an epimethodological approach to causation.
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Dupré (1993) convincingly argues that what one needs in the
practical context of the biomedical and social sciences is an average
effect approach rather than a context unanimity approach to causation. If
we take a closer look at scientific practice within specifically the
biomedical sciences, one will nevertheless rapidly be convinced of the
importance of the search for causal mechanisms, next to the search for
probabilistic evidence. Causal mechanisms are necessary for further
confirming and explaining the causal relations derived on the basis of
correlations. 
This is clearly argued for by, among others, Paul Thagard in How
scientists explain disease (Thagard, 1999). Thagard argues that
knowledge of mechanisms is not strictly necessary, but nonetheless often
searched for by medical researchers, in line with everyday causal
reasoning: 
Whereas causal attribution based on correlation (covariation) alone
would ignore mechanisms connecting cause and effects, ordinary
people are like medical researchers in that they seek mechanisms
that connect cause and effect. [...] Reasoning about mechanisms
can contribute to causal inference, but it is not necessary for such
inference. In domains in which causal knowledge is rich, there is a
kind of feedback loop in which more knowledge about causes leads
to more knowledge about mechanisms, which leads to more
knowledge about causes. But in less well-understood domains,
correlations and the consideration of alternative causes can get
causal knowledge started in the absence of much comprehension of
mechanisms. (Thagard, 1999:109)
 
Thagard (1999) and Ahn & Kalish (2000) indicate three ways in which
causal mechanisms can contribute to our search for causal explanations.
First, they can confirm the existence of possible causal relations
supposed to be present on the basis of a correlation. Hence a mechanism
can help as a confirmative tool. Secondly, when a causal connection
between two variables is supposed on the basis of statistical information,
but no plausible mechanism can be found that elucidates this connection,
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6 The usefulness of this method is nevertheless denied for the social sciences by
Daniel Steel in (Steel 2004), by means of the argument that one can very easily
imagine a plausible mechanism connecting nearly any two variables representing
aspects of social phenomena.
7 A defence of the need for causal pluralism within the social sciences can be
found in Weber (2007).
8 See, for example, Glennan (1996).
we may be confronted with a spurious or a coincidental relation6. In this
case the mechanism works as a disconfirming tool with respect to
statistical evidence. Thirdly, a hypothetical mechanism points to possible
causes that can be (dis)confirmed by other indicators. In this case,
mechanisms work as a heuristic tool for the generation of hypotheses
which are then further testable on the basis of, for example, statistical
information. As Thagard points out, these characteristics constitute three
ways in which mechanisms can enhance the explanatory coherence of
causal explanations. 
According to Thagard’s analyses, biomedical scientific practice is
based on at least two different causal approaches: a probabilistic
approach in terms of average effects, and an approach in terms of causal
mechanisms7. Since the idea of a causal mechanism encloses precisely
the conviction that there is a process at an underlying organizational
level connecting cause and effect, causal mechanisms will clearly not be
of any practical use when trying to get a grip on the causal relations at
the elementary organizational level8, with which Dowe is concerned.
Consequently, this example does not only illustrate that one will (often)
need diverse concepts of causation to successfully gain causal knowledge
within a single scientific domain, but adds as well to my conviction that
one will need diverse causal concepts in diverse scientific domains. 
5. Methodology for the epimethodological causal pluralist 
The examples discussed in the previous sections demonstrate that one
needs a pluralistic epimethodological approach to causation. Scientific
practice cannot do with a single, univocal approach to causation.
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Although this is not yet a generally accepted idea, it seems not that
strange. Let me refer to the words of G. L. Newsome to illustrate this: 
Theorists might integrate (these) approaches by assuming (1) that
cognizers’ conceptions of causality often vary as a function of their
existing world knowledge, and (2) that the role played by different
aspects of these conceptions may vary as a function of the situation
in which the causal judgment is made. (Newsome, 2003:100)
This statement forms part of Newsome’s plea to integrate a covariation
approach with a mechanism approach to causation, but the basic idea can
be generalized to all approaches to causation. 
As is clear from the examples above, one will be confronted with
(a) certain specific conception(s) of causality once one is focussing on a
specific domain of science. This conception will depend on the specific
kind of causal knowledge — related to the typical organizational level of
reality — researchers in the involved domain are working with. Further,
the type of research involved and/or the scientific (sub)domain itself
form a typical situation or context in which the causal judgments are
made — this includes a typical kind of interest one starts from in the
investigation. 
To make this clearer, I introduce the distinction between accuracy
and adequacy, in line with Philip Kither’s view on scientific knowledge
(Kitcher, 2001). In his book, Philip Kitcher compares “making science”
in general with the making of maps in that what is accurate information
on a map is dependent on the needs and desires of the users, and hence
does not need to be in full correspondence with reality: 
Like maps, scientific theories and hypotheses must be true or
accurate (or, at least, approximately true or roughly accurate) to be
good. But there is more to  goodness in both instances. Beyond the
necessary condition is a requirement of significance that cannot be
understood in terms of some projected ideal - completed science, a
Theory of Everything, or an ideal atlas. (Kitcher, 2001:61)
Translated to our framework, accuracy refers to the ability of a causal
theory to describe the way scientists achieve justified knowledge of the
causal relations in the world; adequacy refers to the ability of a causal
theory to describe the way scientists achieve the kind of causal
CAUSAL PLURALISM AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 145
knowledge requested in the involved situation. The latter is related to the
way they look at the (scientific) information they have, the point of view
from which they analyze the situation, the aim in questioning for the
cause, the domain of science they are working in, ... A theory of
causation adequately describes causal reasoning in a certain context if it
shows us how scientists achieve the kind of information they are
interested in, that is, which is useful, relevant, and accessible within the
context they are reasoning from. Further, as Kitcher demonstrates, what
is believed to be an accurate description (of “causation”) is in turn
dependent on what is believed to be an adequate description (of
“causation”) in the involved context: 
What counts as an omission or an inaccurate spatial representation
depends on the conventions associated with the kinds of maps, and,
in their turn, those conventions are in place because of the needs of
the potential users. (Kitcher, 2001: 56)
Let me illustrate this by means of Kitcher’s example, namely the map of
the London Underground. Since this map enables ten thousands of
people a day to successfully find their way through the underground
network, it clearly provides them with an accurate description of this
network. The map is nonetheless not meticulously describing the real
situation of the network in that it does, for example, present all
underground lines as straight lines, and denies the real distance between
the underground stations in its representation of the situation. As
travellers we nevertheless perceive the map as accurate, since it is
accurate in view of its goal of informing us on how to travel from one
underground station to another. In view of this goal, it should provide
certain information and neglect other information, which precisely makes
it an adequate map for users of the London Underground. The same map
would however be totally inadequate for a building contractor planning
public works in the London Underground, since for use in that context, it
would be far too inaccurate with respect to, amongst others, the precise
length of the underground lines and the precise position of the
underground stations. This demonstrates that what is interpreted as an
accurate description depends on what is perceived as adequate in the
context.
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When returning to the probabilistic versus the mechanical
approach in the biomedical sciences, there seems no objective reason to
prefer one analysis above the other, nor to demand that each accepted
causal relation should be confirmed by both approaches. In fact, it will be
the situation within which we need to decide on the acceptance of a
causal relation which will be decisive for the approach to causation to
prefer. As Thagard suggested, in a phase of the survey in which
knowledge of specific mechanisms is lacking, statistical information can
be taken as a sufficient proof for a causal relation, while it is on the other
hand possible that in other situations one will require an explaining
mechanism before accepting a certain causal relation. Similarly, if we
really want to understand the specific process leading to a certain effect,
we may focus on causal mechanisms, while focussing on probabilistic
evidence if we are mainly searching for general tendencies. As Hitchcock
(2003) claimed: 
When we are asked what causes what, we may pay attention to one
of these relations in one scenario, to another of these relations in a
different scenario. One of these relations may be a component of
one philosophically significant concept, while another is a
component of another. All of these relations are causal, in a broad
sense, and worthy objects of study within a theory of causation.
(Hitchcock, 2003:8) 
Hence whether a certain causal theory is adequate for our purposes,
depends on the context within which we are reasoning and the particular
interests connected with it. Striving for a causal theory adequate for use
in all or a lot of divergent possible contexts in which causal reasoning
occurs, will be at the expense of the required accuracy since no single
theory seems able to capture our notion of “causality” in all its diversity
in an accurate way. Hence, it is the situation in which the causal
judgment is made that determines which approach we will choose as
accurate and adequate for our purposes, and consequently, which factor
will be labelled as the cause. 
The question that may follow is whether this does not inevitably
result in a very particularistic approach? Do we need to analyze the
usefulness of a certain approach to causation for each causal reasoning
process on its own? Of course this forms no solution. Consequently, the
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problem is to find a feasible approach that stands midway between a too
monolithic and a too particularistic one. 
Given that the requirement of accuracy and adequacy demands for
a pluralistic approach to causation, my proposal is precisely to start
thinking from domains of application when developing an
epimethodological approach to causation. With this I come back to my
conclusions from the plea of Newsome. To sum up, if we reason from a
certain fixed (sub)domain of science, we are confronted with a fixed kind
of knowledge and organizational level of the world researchers are
reasoning from and with a fixed kind of research situation and some
typical research interests. The former seem to ask for a proper form of
accuracy, the latter seem to ask for adequacy, such that the demanded
accuracy is attainable after all. Hence reasoning from specific
(sub)domains offers a tool to fix the way in which one can reason
accurately and adequately and hence justifies generalization over the
concerned (sub)domain. Focussing on domains will give us the
possibility to generalize over a broad area of application. The unity in the
way of reasoning about causal relations within one such domain will
justify these generalizations. 
Remark that we have to do with a continuum ranging from
generalizing over several contiguous domains of science (e.g. the social
and behavioral sciences, the natural sciences) to specifying into
particular subdomains (e.g. medical etiology). The more we specify, the
better our characterization of the involved causal concept(s) will do and
the easier it will be to increase the accuracy of our causal theories, but
the more our characterizations can become fragmented. However,
working this way will offer us anyhow some theories of causation that
are much closer to the scientific reality than the ones who aim at an
overall characterization of the concept of causation inherent in scientific
theories.
6. Conclusion
I tried to convince the reader that one should discriminate between three
approaches to causal pluralism: conceptual causal pluralism,
metaphysical causal pluralism, and epimethodological causal pluralism. I
have further tried to demonstrate what kinds of questions can be
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answered if one takes an epimethodological approach as an approach of
importance on its own. This led me to the defence of epimethodological
causal pluralism, by demonstrating that science needs diverse causal
concepts in diverse scientific domains, and even diverse causal concepts
within singular domains. A lot of work is to be done yet to substantiate
epimethodological causal pluralism by further investigating its
characteristic research questions in relation to specific scientific
domains. The resulting pluralistic approach to causation will anyhow be
closer to scientific reality, and will not force one to adopt certain
metaphysical positions which cannot be (directly) derived from it.
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